Mine and UXO Risk Reduction in Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia
Since Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia have similar mine and unexploded ordnance risk
problems, a regional approach may contribute to finding solutions for these three.
Understanding common features and challenges is a first step toward reducing the number of casualties in the region.

2005

marks the 30th anniversary of the end
of the conflict variously called, depending on the speaker’s perspective, the “Vietnam War,”
“American War” or “Second Indochina War,” encompassing Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia. All sides and observers agree the conflict was one of the most costly in world
history in terms of loss of human life and use of military
ordnance, including bombs and mines of all kinds. Thirty
years later, while significant cleanup of this ordnance has
taken place—first by regional governments, then through
international non-governmental organizations, corporations and bilateral donors—landmines and unexploded
ordnance still kill or maim over 1,000 people each year in
the three Indochina countries. Why does this still occur?
What can be done to educate people about the risk from
mines and UXO, or reduce it by other means, so that no
more new casualties take place?
These were among the questions posed at a regional
workshop on landmine and UXO risk education in the
Mekong subregion, held in Siem Reap, Cambodia, in
November 2004. This workshop, cosponsored by the
Fund for Reconciliation and Development (a U.S.-based
NGO) and the Cambodian Red Cross, brought together
75 practitioners and program managers from the three
Indochina countries, as well as Afghanistan, Burma,
Sri Lanka and Thailand. UNICEF-Vietnam, Catholic
Relief Services and Consortium—Laos provided additional funding support. Through presentations, small
group discussions and a collective writing exercise, participants identified best practices, lessons learned and
recommendations for mine and UXO risk education
across national boundaries.
It goes without saying that each country in the region
is different economically, politically and geographically.
However, UXO and mine contamination in the three
countries share common features due to their specific
historical experiences in the 1960s and 1970s and subsequent development.
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metal collecting. With no other employment options,
adult males living in contaminated areas search for UXO,
remove it from the ground and sell it to local dealers, who
then remove the valuable metal and explosives for resale
and sometimes export. In some cases, children are also
involved, either as passive observers or active participants.
International organizations working in Savannakhet
province, Laos, have documented recruitment of children to search for and remove scrap metal. Adults and
children carrying cheap metal detectors are a common
sight along the Lao-Vietnam border and in other contaminated areas.
Reports from all three countries indicate that anywhere
from 30 to 80 percent of UXO casualties result from
tampering. The actual numbers may be even higher, as
many survey respondents provide unlikely answers, such
as “nothing happened—it just exploded,” that could be
cover stories for tampering. Scrap-metal collecting is not
illegal in itself, but handling of explosives is, and survivors
may fear that they will not receive assistance if they admit
to handling live ordnance. In any case, observers attribute
the roughly 50-percent increase in casualties noted in 2004
entirely to increased tampering. The report from Phase I
of the Vietnam national impact survey, being carried out
by the Ministry of Defense Engineering Command and
the Vietnam Veterans of America Foundation, is expected
to confirm these findings.
Given that tampering is an economic activity, why
is it increasing at a time when economic development is
occurring in the countries of Indochina as never before?
The simplest answer is that scrap and explosives collectors are not benefiting equally from economic growth.
Meanwhile, increased demand for metal and explosives in
the construction, mining and timber industries, among
others, has raised the sale price of these items to new
highs. New roads are providing easy access to heavily contaminated areas that have not been populated or exploited
since the war. Additionally, metal detectors have become
cheaper and more easily available.
The tampering crisis is difficult to resolve using traditional mine risk education messages. Most people, or
at least most adults, involved in the scrap trade are fully
aware of the risks they are taking but proceed regardless. Solutions must include economic and livelihood
components as well as UXO-specific ones. Among the
suggestions raised in the 2004 regional workshop were
the following:
• Expand common development strategies to other
organizations working in the same areas; integrate
MRE with economic development activities.
• Share experiences and lessons learned by communities affected by UXO with others, for instance
survivors visiting the homes of scrap dealers.
• Involve scrap collectors in village MRE and mine
action activities.
• Provide alternative vocational training and job
placement services.

Tampering—The Main Cause
of UXO Casualties
“Tampering” means deliberate handling of ordnance
with the goal of extracting metal and/or explosives. This
is often referred to as, or lumped together with, scrap

Need for Data-gathering
and Assistance to New Survivors
From a public health and injury prevention perspective, current casualty risks in all three countries are relatively low in comparison to other injuries, especially road
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A Regional Approach

UXO Versus AP Mine Contamination
The primacy of UXO contamination over that of antipersonnel mines is overwhelmingly prevalent in Laos and
Vietnam, where national and local surveys have found
that over 90 percent—and up to as high as 97 percent—
of remaining ordnance in the ground consists of cluster
bombs, grenades, aircraft bombs, shells, rockets and other
UXO, not landmines. Less commonly known is the fact
that this is also true in most of Cambodia, where UXO
casualties now exceed AP mine casualties by a factor of 2or 3-to-1. With the exception of the K5 mine belt along
Cambodia’s border with Thailand, the remainder of the
country shows patterns of contamination quite similar to
those in Laos and Vietnam.
In contrast to AP mines, which are “always on” and are
designed to explode at the slightest touch, many pieces
of UXO appear inactive and may remain so until repeatedly struck or tampered with. Others are highly unstable
and could respond differently to stimuli depending on
the time and environment. Many pieces of ordnance can
be handled repeatedly without exploding, but this offers
no guarantee for the next person who encounters them.
Cluster bomblets—the ubiquitous BLU 26/36 “bombies” dropped in immense quantities up and down the
former Ho Chi Minh Trail and on other aerial bombing
targets—are particularly sensitive to handling due to their
fuse mechanisms.
Incidents involving UXO frequently claim multiple
victims, as shrapnel may be scattered over a wide area,
and cause upper-body injuries, burns, and/or blindness
to survivors—a profile divergent from the single-victim,
lower-limb amputation consequences of many AP mine
explosions. Furthermore, the pieces of UXO themselves
are not laid in minefields but can be found randomly.
Facing no alternative, people continue to plant in UXOcontaminated fields, hunt and gather in contaminated
forests and live in contaminated villages. When encountering UXO, they walk around, use local marking methods or move UXO to a more out-of-the-way location.
Thus, traditional AP mine risk education messages
such as “don’t touch,” “don’t move,” “report to the authorities” are neither appropriate nor effective in areas
with mainly UXO contamination. Local people have
been touching and moving UXO for decades, and many
feel (rightly or wrongly) they know how to do so safely.
Moreover, there may not be authorities to report to or, if
there are, they will not respond without payment and/or
a long wait.
As a consequence, several international mine action
organizations in Cambodia and Laos are experimenting
with programs to involve villagers in clearance activities
and in developing new MRE messages. “Village demining” or “villager-assisted clearance” remains controversial
in the mine action community owing to safety (and liability) concerns. Community-based education, by contrast,
is widely accepted and formed a key part of discussions in
the November 2004 regional workshop.

A Cambodian woman and her child
walk past a mine field to collect water in
Kompong, Speu, southern Cambodia, April
1, 2000. Mines stifle economic activity in
Cambodian villages and endanger lives.

Yei marcher: A laywoman marches during Mine Awareness Day in Phnom Penh, Cambodia.
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Destroying the

Mother

of All Arsenals”

Captured Enemy Ammunition Operations in Iraq
A Russian FAB-5000 M54 high-explosive bomb in the vicinity of Zakho, northern Iraq (August 2004).
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ticle gives a first-hand view of the
perils in Iraq.
by COL George Zahaczewsky Ret. U.S. Army

O

n 20 March 2003, United States and Coalition
Forces crossed the border into Iraq, initiating
ground combat operations during Operation
Iraqi Freedom. Almost immediately, they encountered
vast stockpiles of conventional Iraqi munitions. Much
of the ammunition was in pristine condition, while large
amounts of other ordnance had been looted, scavenged
or damaged during combat operations. It soon became
apparent that a major effort would be required to secure
and dispose of these stockpiles.

Assessing and Managing the Problem
The discovery of these “ammo dumps” was not unexpected. Preparations to deal with
captured enemy ammunition were part of the initial campaign planning for Operation
Iraqi Freedom that started in October 2002. What was not appreciated until much later
in 2003 was the scope of the problem. Ground commanders quickly put together plans
and manpower in an attempt to secure or destroy the enormous caches of ammunition
their units were encountering. These well-intentioned efforts would eventually produce
mixed results and, in some instances, amplify the problem.
Increased awareness but uncertainty of the magnitude of the captured enemy ammunition (CEA) problem resulted in the United States Army Corps of Engineers requesting
to conduct an assessment in June/July 2003 to determine if their existing munitions remediation programs could bring aid. Specifically, Combined Joint Task Force 7 (CJTF-7)
sought assistance in the munitions collection process, the transportation of the ordnance
to disposal areas and the operation of the demolition sites themselves.
Due to the perceived urgency of the situation, CJTF-7 wanted capability in place
within 30 days of the assessment to begin reducing or replacing military personnel
and equipment engaged in the CEA mission (now renamed the Coalition Munitions
Clearance program). Combined Joint Task Force 7—the “customer”—wanted the U.S.
Army Corps of Engineers and its contractors to provide a “cradle-to-grave” service that
could eventually be transferred over to Iraqi authorities.
Funding was provided to the Corps of Engineers on 28 July 2003 to commence
CEA operations. USACE awarded several contracts on 8 Aug. 2003—one to the Parsons
Corporation (Pasadena, Calif.) for $80 million (U.S.) to provide the logistical support for
the overall effort, and three contracts worth $67 million each to the following unexploded ordnance contractors: Explosive Ordnance Disposal Technologies (Knoxville, Tenn.),
Tetra Tech-Foster Wheeler (Pasadena, Calif.), and USA Environmental, Inc. (Tampa,
Fla.). The scope of work for the contractors included the following requirements:
• Manage ammunition supply points/collection points (ASP/CP).
• Perform demolition of unserviceable munitions.
• Perform demolition of priority munitions as identified by CJTF-7.
• Perform transportation of CEA from caches to ammunition supply points/collection points or demolition areas as required and transport prepared demolition
loads of CEA from ASP/CP to the demolition area.
• Perform surface unexploded ordnance clearances, booby trap clearances, disablement of unconventional warfare devices, site investigations, evaluations and responses in support of the CEA mission.
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accidents (which claimed the lives of 6,000 Vietnamese in
The Cambodia Mine/UXO Victim Information System
the first half of 2005 alone). Cambodia, Laos and Vietnam
(CMVIS) has proven to be an effective tool in monitordo have among the highest numbers of mine and UXO
ing casualties and ensuring full reporting nationwide. Laos,
survivors in the world, but most of these were injured
which also has a national program with significant internaduring or immediately after conflicts that have now been
tional assistance, will implement a similar system, tentaover for decades. In Vietnam especially, the population of
tively titled LUMVIS, in late 2005 or early 2006.
mine/UXO survivors is aging, posing a new set of health
Surprisingly, given its size and level of development,
challenges for government agencies and non-governmental
Vietnam remains the most difficult of the three countries
organizations involved in their care.
in which to gather and share information. The challenge in
Nevertheless, there is a compelling case for continuing
Vietnam is how to expand successful models of cooperato collect information and provide assistance to new viction in several central provinces to other parts of the countims as well. First, there are still significant numbers of new
try that are also heavily affected by UXO and landmines,
deaths and injuries each year; since 2000, these have averparticularly along the south-central coast and in the central
aged approximately 800 per year in Cambodia (with full
highlands. A successful, proactive casualty information
reporting), 200 in Vietnam and 100 in Laos (with incomsystem need not be top-heavy or bureaucratic, but does
plete reporting). Cambodia ranks no. 3 or no. 4 worldwide
require central-level support, assured funding, and intein reported casualties, Vietnam around no. 10 and Laos
gration with existing health and disability data sources. If
between no. 15 and 20, depending on the year. Each cathese objectives can be achieved in Cambodia and Laos,
sualty affects not only the individuals involved, but also
they are certainly within Vietnam’s capacity as well.
their families and communities, frequently with devastatTo date, international donor funding for mine action and
ing effects on family finances through medical bills, transvictim assistance has been spread quite unevenly among the
portation costs and lost income. Thus, while longer-term
three countries. Cambodia has received an average of $20
survivors may have adapted to their injuries, new survivors
million (U.S.) per year over the last five years, or roughly $2
and their families, as well as the families of those killed by
per capita. Laos has received $5 million annually, around
mines and UXO, face immediate costs and challenges.
$1 per capita. Vietnam has averaged $5–10 million, or
Second, the historical circumstances of the Indochinese
about $0.10 per capita. This discrepancy appears likely to
conflict offer clear moral reasons for increased assistance.
continue. For instance, Australia announced in July 2005
The U.S. government and NGOs as representatives of the
that it will provide $57 million for mine clearance and vicAmerican people have a particular
responsibility, given that the vast
majority of remaining lethal ordAmong the populations most at risk are
nance is of U.S. origin, certainly
the poorest, ethnic minority groups and
in Laos and Vietnam, and also in
eastern and central Cambodia.
those living in remote areas—which are
Among the populations most at
often overlapping categories.
risk are the poorest, ethnic minority groups and those living in
remote areas—which are often
overlapping categories. Indeed, mines and UXO form one
tim assistance in the southeast Asia region over the next five
of the obstacles these groups face toward equitable, sustainyears. Reports indicate the majority of this funding will be
able development together with national majorities.
sent to Cambodia and Laos, though Vietnam will also be
What does this analysis suggest for mine action proconsidered. There are doubtless political as well as operagrams and the international donor community? First,
tional reasons for donors’ funding decisions, but given the
reduction of risk—not area cleared or numbers of ordsimilarities in UXO contamination, tampering and scrap
nance—should become the primary objective of all mine/
metal activities and risk profiles, a more regionally balanced
UXO action activities. In most situations, given limited
approach would seem warranted.
resources, this means foregoing expensive site-clearance
The regional workshop on mine/UXO risk education
operations in favor of mobile explosive ordnance removal
described above offers one model of increased cooperation
and small-scale, community-level clearance. Many internaacross national boundaries without high levels of bureautional agencies are already taking steps in this direction. A
cracy or organizing costs. Other activities currently being
subsequent step, again being pioneered by several existing
implemented include multi-country research projects, site
operators, is the formation of UXO-specific operating provisits from one country to another, exchange of experiences
cedures, rather than simply applying anti-personnel mine
within international organizations working in more than
terminology and techniques to what is in most places a disone country in the region and formation of informal parttinctly different problem. This applies as strongly to mine
nerships among national NGOs, who may in some cases
risk education programs.
receive funds from the same external donor(s). Of course,
The regional workshop in Siem Reap also recommendintergovernmental cooperation remains necessary and bened closer cooperation in MRE and mine clearance among
eficial as well. The more information publicly shared and
the Mekong subregion and neighboring countries, with
the more stakeholders from various sectors participate fully
specific emphasis on accurate data on mine/UXO conin creative problem solving, the more quickly Cambodia,
Laos and Vietnam will move toward becoming a minetamination and casualties. Where information is lacking
and UXO-risk-free region in the future.
or inadequate, additional field surveys and mine marking
See “References and Endnotes,” page 104.
should be conducted to better target MRE interventions.
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3. As observed by MAG Cambodia’s technical operations manager, Gary Fenton.
4. See work undertaken on village demining by Ruth Bottomley, HI-B. http://www.handicapinternational.be/downloads/SpontaneousDeminingInitiatives.pdf,
accessed Dec. 13, 2005.

Afghanistan LIS, Fruchet [ from page 38 ]
endnote
1. A Landmine Impact Survey, or LIS, is a community-based national survey that measures the extent of the impact of the landmine problem in a country, based on the number of
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endnote
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How can economists contribute to Mine Action, Marsh [ from page 51 ]
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